The cognitive integration of scientific instruments: Information, situated cognition, and scientific practice by Heersmink, Richard
The cognitive integration of scientific instruments:
information, situated cognition, and scientific practice
Richard Heersmink1,2
Published online: 1 July 2015
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
Abstract Researchers in the biological and biomedical sciences, particularly those
working in laboratories, use a variety of artifacts to help them perform their cognitive
tasks. This paper analyses the relationship between researchers and cognitive artifacts
in terms of integration. It first distinguishes different categories of cognitive artifacts
used in biological practice on the basis of their informational properties. This results in
a novel classification of scientific instruments, conducive to an analysis of the cognitive
interactions between researchers and artifacts. It then uses a multidimensional frame-
work in line with complementarity-based extended and distributed cognition theory to
conceptualize how deeply instruments in different informational categories are inte-
grated into the cognitive systems of their users. The paper concludes that the degree of
integration depends on various factors, including the amount of informational mallea-
bility, the intensity and kind of information flow between agent and artifact, the
trustworthiness of the information, the procedural and informational transparency,
and the degree of individualisation.
Keywords Cognitive artifacts . Scientific instruments . Distributed cognition .
Extendedmind . Scientific practice
1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to better understand the interactions and integration between
researchers and cognitive artifacts in biology laboratories. It draws on and contributes
to independent debates in situated cognition theory (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Menary
2007; Kirsh 2009; Rowlands 2009; Sutton 2010) and the philosophy of scientific
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practice (Giere 2002a, b; Nersessian 2005, 2009). By doing so, it produces mutual
benefits for both situated cognition theory and the philosophy of scientific practice by
bringing issues from the other area to bear. The analysis is set up in two broad stages. In
the first stage, I develop a classification system of cognitive artifacts in biological
practice. To this end, I begin by briefly outlining a previously developed method for
classifying cognitive artifacts on the basis of their informational properties (Heersmink
2013). Next, I apply this informational approach to classify artifacts in biology
laboratories (section BClassifying cognitive artifacts in biological practice^).
In the second stage, I conceptualize how researchers and artifacts interact and are, in
some cases, integrated into larger distributed cognitive systems. I first survey and
evaluate how a number of philosophers have used a distributed cognition approach to
theorize about agent-artifact interaction in scientific practice (Giere 2002a, b;
Nersessian 2005, 2009) and point out some shortcomings of their approaches (section
BDistributed cognition in scientific practice^). I then present a previously developed
multidimensional framework to conceptualize the degree of cognitive integration
between humans and artifacts (Heersmink 2014). This framework consists of various
dimensions that are all matters of degree and jointly constitute a multidimensional
space in which situated cognitive systems can be located, including those that are
embedded and extended/distributed (section BCognitive integration^). This framework
is then used to analyse the degree of integration between researchers and artifacts by
focussing on four case studies: (1) computer models of protein folding, (2) pH-meters,
(3) laboratory notebooks, and (4) organised workplaces (section BConceptualizing
cognitive integration: case studies^).
2 Classifying cognitive artifacts in biological practice
With the exception of New Experimentalism (e.g., Hacking 1983; Ackerman 1985), the
role of instruments in scientific practice has not played a prominent role in traditional
philosophy of science. Only recently have philosophers of science showed interest in
instruments and their functional role in experiments and the creation of scientific
knowledge (Baird 2003; Harré 2003; Boon 2004; Record 2010). Some of these
philosophers developed classifications of scientific instruments (Baird 2003; Harré
2003; Boon 2004), classifying what Ackerman (1985) calls the Binstrumentarium^,
which are all instruments used by scientists, including those that do not have cognitive
functions. Because current classifications do not focus on cognitive artifacts, but on
instruments in general, they have overlooked some categories of cognitive artifacts.
Specifically, they have not included what I below refer to as Bsymbolic cognitive
artifacts^ and Becological cognitive artifacts^. To overcome this issue and develop a
more inclusive picture, I now propose an alternative classification of cognitive artifacts
used in biology labs in terms of their informational properties.
2.1 Informational properties of artifacts
Given the importance of the nature of external information in supporting cognitive
tasks, (Heersmink 2013) classifies cognitive artifacts on the basis of their distinct
informational properties. In the classification, I made a distinction between artifacts
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exhibiting Brepresentational^ and Becological^ properties. Those with representational
properties function as stand-ins for their target system and have aboutness or represen-
tational content. Examples include maps, traffic signs, thermometers, scale models,
timetables, textbooks, and many other artifacts. Those with ecological or non-
representational properties, by contrast, do not function as stand-ins for their target
and do not have content. Examples include leaving a rented DVD on your desk as a
reminder to bring it back to the video store, or reorganising letter tiles when playing
Scrabble to prompt word recall.
Further distinctions within these two broad categories were then made. In case of
representational artifacts, a distinction between icons, indices, and symbols was made
(Peirce 1935). Icons display isomorphism between icon and target. A map, for exam-
ple, is isomorphic to what it represents. Indices have a direct causal connection to their
target. A thermometer is directly linked to the temperature. If the temperature changes,
the reading on a thermometer changes as well. Symbols do not have isomorphism or a
direct connection to their target, but obtain their meaning through convention, logical
rules, and shared use. Language and mathematics are clear examples. Some artifacts
have a combination of two or more of these representational properties. A map is
isomorphic but often also contains symbols such as words and numbers. Likewise, a
thermometer is indexical, but typically also contains symbols such as numbers. A
representational artifact is thus often predominantly iconic, indexical, or symbolic.
In case of ecological artifacts, a distinction between spatial and dynamic artifacts
was made. Spatial ecological artifacts get their cognitive function because we have
placed these objects, such as DVDs, deliberately in a usual or unusual location such
that when we see the artifact in that location it prompts a memory. Likewise, cooks
organize their work-environment such that the location of the utensils and ingredients
facilitate the task they are doing. Cognitive scientist David Kirsh (1995) refers to this as
Bthe intelligent use of space^. Kirsh makes a tripartite distinction between spatial
arrangements that simplify choice, perception, or internal computation. Thus the
cognitive function of such spatial arrangements is not representational, but to simplify
decision-making, perception and recognition, and internal cognitive processing. These
examples of self-organized environments do not exhibit aboutness or content, because
they neither have isomorphism or a direct causal connection to their targets, nor are
they based on convention, logical rules, or shared use. Rather, by idiosyncratically
putting artifacts in certain locations that are either deliberately usual or unusual, we
intentionally encode task-relevant information into the artifact and its location.
Dynamic ecological artifacts obtain their cognitive function in virtue of their
manipulable physical structure. When playing Scrabble, for example, players some-
times reorganise the letter tiles, as to aid word recall (Kirsh 1995, 2009; Clark and
Chalmers 1998). This is very difficult to do internally as our mental imagery is rather
limited, so most players reorganize letter tiles to help them come up with new words.
The point here is that the cognitive function of rearranging letter tiles is not based on
representational properties (as is the case with for example maps, thermometers, or
written language). Rather, their cognitive function is based on their manipulable
physical structures, and by manipulating their physical structure one automatically
manipulates the information they contain as well. Note that individual letters are not
representational, they become representational only when combined into words. Com-
pared to spatial artifacts such as putting rented DVDs at some place, rearranging letter
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tiles is a much more dynamic process. It is not so much about developing static spatial
categories in which artifacts are placed, but more about dynamically and constantly
changing information in an ongoing cognitive task.
In a sense, this is not so much a classification of artifacts but more of the
informational properties they exhibit. In developing this classification system, an
informational approach was chosen because the way cognitive artifacts are used
depends on the information they contain. A map, for instance, is useful for the cognitive
task of navigating because the predominantly iconic information it exhibits aids
decision-making processes in relation to navigating. There are at least two reasons
why this taxonomy is helpful in better understanding scientific practice. First, it allows
us to categorize scientific instruments in terms of their informational properties,
resulting in a novel way of classifying scientific instruments, conducive to an analysis
of the cognitive interactions between researcher and artifact. Second, as we will see
below, it helps identify overlooked categories of cognitive artifacts in scientific
practice.
2.2 Representational artifacts
Having presented a general method for classifying cognitive artifacts, I now use the
above categories to group artifacts used in biology labs. Icons are characterized by
exhibiting isomorphism with their targets and there are many of those in biological
practice. The most prominent of these are photographs, diagrams, and scientific
models. Of all the cognitive artifacts used in science, diagrams and models have
received the most attention from philosophers (e.g., Perini 2005; Knuuttila 2005,
2011; Toon 2012; Charbonneau 2013; Sheredos et al. 2014). Diagrams and models
are important because they aid the cognitive processes of their users. When theorizing
about the interactions between agents and models Tarja Knuuttila says: BFrom this
perspective models function as external tools for thinking, the construction and manip-
ulation of which are crucial to their epistemic functioning^ (Knuuttila 2011, p 262).
There are countless models used in biology that are isomorphic to their targets, for
instance two-dimensional and three-dimensional models of the structure of biomole-
cules. An historically important example is James Watson and Francis Crick’s physical
scale-model of the structure of DNA. There also models that represent processes and
mechanisms like simulations of cell division, gene expression, metabolism, endocyto-
sis, or protein folding. However, it is important to note that models need not be
isomorphic (Suarez 2003). Many models in biology (for example in genetics) are
statistical or mathematical in nature, showing no similarity to their target system. Some
models may thus also be classified as symbolic in nature.
Indices are characterized by a direct causal connection between the representational
state of the index and its target system. Biologists use a variety of indices, including
graduated cylinders to measure the amount of liquid, thermometers to measure tem-
perature, hemocytometers to count to number of cells in a solution, pH meters to
measure the acidity of a solution, scales to measure the weight of some substance,
pycnometers to measure fluid density, etc. Indices are essential to many scientific
practices, including those in biology. Science investigates the world empirically and
the best way to do so is by measuring it with the aid of indices. Moreover, given that
biology often deals with microscopic structures, which are inherently invisible to the
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unaided human eye, there is only one way to empirically obtain information about such
target systems and that is with indices.
Symbols obtain their meaning and content through shared use, agreement, and logical
rules. Typical examples are natural and artificial languages, numbers, mathematical
systems, tables, equations, and scientific formulae. Symbols and symbolic structures are
ubiquitous in biology labs, as they are found in manuals for equipment, textbooks,
scientific articles, patents, and laboratory notebooks. They are also found on indices like
thermometers, voltmeters, and other indices that indicate the quantity of their target
systems in numbers. A paradigm symbolic structure in molecular biology is the periodic
table of elements, which is a table of the chemical elements organised on the basis of
their atomic numbers. There is no isomorphism or direct causal connection between the
table and its target, the order in which the elements are presented is based purely on
logical rules and agreement. Another prominent symbolic cognitive artifact is the
laboratory notebook. Researchers working in biology labs have a personalised notebook
in which they document their hypotheses, experimental procedures and outcomes, and
observations made during the experiment. The majority of information in laboratory
notebooks is symbolic in nature (e.g., language, equations, tables, calculations). I
therefore classify notebooks as a predominantly symbolic cognitive artifact, but they
may also contain iconic representations such as diagrams or sketches (Yeo 2008).
2.3 Ecological cognitive artifacts
Spatial ecological artifacts obtain their cognitive function in virtue of physical-spatial
structures. Specifically, by intentionally putting artifacts in usual or unusual places we
encode task-relevant information into the artifact and its location. This also happens in
biology labs. A researcher may, for instance, intentionally leave an alcohol bottle at an
unusual location on the laboratory bench as a reminder to clean and disinfect the bench
after doing an experiment. Researchers may also structure their work-environment in
more complex ways. When performing an experiment, they use a variety of instruments
like, for example, pipets, test tubes, beakers, flasks, racks, stopwatches, heaters, etc.
Experimental procedures require that these instruments are used in a certain order.
Novice researchers often use a laboratory notebook in which the experimental proce-
dure is outlined, which helps them to remember the steps in the experiment. But more
experienced researchers may have developed strategies that make the notebook partly
superfluous.
Consider the following example. The main steps in a DNA isolation procedure are:
(1) break cells open by adding lysozyme, (2) remove membrane lipids by adding a
detergent, (3) remove proteins by adding protease, (4) remove RNA by adding RNase,
and (5) purify DNA by ethanol precipitation. Given the order of these steps, it makes
sense to organize the workplace such that the lysozyme is located close to the
experimenter, as this is the chemical s/he needs first. Likewise, the detergent should
also be located quite close as this is the second chemical s/he needs in the overall
procedure, etc. How the workbench and the artifacts are organized is important for
performing the cognitive task at hand. Researchers therefore prepare the laboratory
bench before they begin the experiment. They will most likely also create locations on
the workbench that are reserved for artifacts that have been used and are no longer
needed. Thus when the first step is performed, the bottle containing lysozyme will be
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put at a spot that indicates it has been used. For example, the chemicals needed for the
experiment may be put on her right hand side in the same order in which they are used
in the experiment, and the chemicals s/he has used may be put on her left hand side,
thereby creating spatial boundaries that help the researcher in performing the experi-
ment. I was unable to find examples of dynamic ecological artifacts in biological
practice in the literature. I do, however, think it is likely that such artifacts and
practices occur in biology, but this hypothesis can only be tested by empirical
observations.
3 Distributed cognition in scientific practice
Before I conceptualize how some of the above classified cognitive artifacts and their
users are integrated into larger cognitive systems, I briefly survey a small body of
literature concerning distributed cognition in scientific practice.
3.1 Ronald Giere
Giere uses a distributed cognition framework to better understand certain aspects of
scientific research. For example, Giere (2002a; see also Cheon 2014; Toon 2014; Pence
et al. 2015) investigates how scientific models can be part of distributed cognitive
systems. He says that models are not just aids for cognition, but are when properly
manipulated, part of a distributed cognitive process. He emphasises that humans cannot
store, let alone manipulate, complex scientific models in their head. They need to create
and manipulate external representations that complement the shortcomings of the
pattern matching abilities of embodied brains. He writes:
BPhysical models provide what is probably the best case for understanding
model-based reasoning as an example of distributed cognition. Here it is very
clear that one need not be performing logical operations on an internal represen-
tation. It is sufficient to perform and observe appropriate physical operations^
(Giere 2002a, p. 9).
Giere makes an interesting claim about the affordances of models exhibiting differ-
ent kinds of representational formats (see also Vorms 2012). He claims that Watson and
Crick with their physical three-dimensional model were able to discover the correct
structure of DNA, whereas Rosalind Franklin, who only had two-dimensional X-ray
photographs and hand-drawn diagrams, was unable to discover the structure of DNA.
There may, of course, have been other factors involved in the discovery of the structure
of DNA, but Giere nonetheless is onto something here. The specific informational
properties and affordances of the model are important for performing the cognitive task.
So physical models, in this case, are better for performing this cognitive task as
compared to photographs and sketches on paper, because they complement onboard
cognitive systems in a more effective way.
Giere also theorizes about larger distributed cognitive systems. When talking about
the Indiana University Cyclotron Facility, he says that BIt is particularly enlightening to
think of the whole facility as one big cognitive system comprised, in part, of lots of
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smaller cognitive systems^ (Giere 2002b, p. 8). He then goes on to list some of the
components of this big cognitive system, including the accelerator, detectors, com-
puters, and the people actively working on the experiment. Likewise, he writes that the
Hubble Telescope and the researchers using it can be seen as one distributed cognitive
system. A single experiment may include fifty to five-hundred people and countless
computing systems processing the data integrated into one distributed cognitive system.
As a criterion for thinking about when something is part of a distributed cognitive
system Giere writes: Bwe can distinguish those features of the system that differentially
influence the output of the system in scientifically relevant ways from those features
that merely make it possible for the system to generate any output at all^ (Giere 2002b,
p. 11). Researchers interacting with instrumentation have an influence over the outcome
of experiments, so both researchers and instruments are part of the system, whereas the
electricity powering the instruments does not differentially influence the particular
output and is thus not part of the distributed cognitive system.
3.2 Nancy Nersessian
Nersessian (2005, 2008, 2009) also uses a distributed cognition framework to analyse
scientific practice. She writes: BWithin this framing, to understand how problem
solving is achieved requires examining the generation, manipulation, and propagation
of salient representations within the system; that is, examining how representational
states flow across media and accomplish cognitive work^ (Nersessian 2009, p. 732).
Her work is particularly relevant for this paper as she focusses on biomedical engi-
neering (BME) labs. Such labs differ from the paradigm cases of distributed cognitive
systems that Ed Hutchins (1995) has analysed. Nersessian points out that navigators on
board of a ship face problems that change over time, but the artifacts and the knowledge
that the agents bring to the situation remain largely stable. Such systems are thus
dynamic but synchronic, so the functional and informational properties of the cognitive
artifacts remain largely the same over time. By contrast, a BME lab can be seen as an
evolving distributed cognitive system, so both the knowledge of the scientists and the
functional and informational properties of the artifacts and models change over time.
Thus the BME lab as a distributed cognitive system is dynamic and diachronic:
researchers and artifacts change in relation to each other. This dynamic and diachronic
relation between researcher and cognitive artifact is characterized as a Bcognitive
partnership^. BWe use the notion of cognitive partnership to characterize the special
relations that develop among researchers and between them and simulation devices (as
opposed to other important artifacts such as the pipette or confocal microscope)^
(Nersessian 2009, p. 741). Cognitive partnering thus does not occur with simple
instruments but only with simulation devices, which are engineered models of biolog-
ical target systems.
3.3 Discussion
The above approaches are perceptive and I am largely in agreement with them. There
is, however, some room for improvement. Giere’s criterion for determining when
something is part of a distributed cognitive system is not sufficiently clear and perhaps
too liberal to be helpful. On his view, agents or artifacts have to differentially influence
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the output of the system in order to be part of the distributed cognitive system. This is
an interesting way to think about system membership in general, but it might be too
liberal as a criterion for membership of distributed cognitive systems. This is so
because it results in what critics of extended cognition have called Bcognitive bloat^,
which is roughly the idea that cognition extends into too many things (see e.g., Rupert
2004). If we include everything that differentially influences the output of a cognitive
system, it results in cognitive systems that are distributed too widely. This criterion may
be one of the reasons why some of Giere’s examples are perhaps somewhat unsup-
ported. For instance, he argued that entire research facilities such as the Indiana
University Cyclotron Facility, including all the people performing experiments, consti-
tute one large distributed cognitive system. It is one thing to claim that entire research
facilities constitute one distributed cognitive system, but it is quite another thing to
explain in detail how and why hundreds of researchers interacting with instruments
constitute such a system.
J. Adam Carter et al. (2014) distinguish between three varieties of active external-
ism: the extended mind, the extended cognition, and the distributed cognition theses.
On their view, the first focuses on extended mental states of individuals, e.g., when
Otto, a man with Alzheimer’s disease, stores his beliefs in a notebook. The second
focuses on extended cognitive processes of individuals, e.g., when someone performs a
calculation with pen and paper. The third focuses on cognitive processes that are
distributed across members of a social group interacting with cognitive artifacts, e.g.,
two pilots interacting with instruments in a cockpit. A reviewer pointed out that the
cognitive bloat objection plausibly applies to the extended mind thesis, but not to the
extended and distributed cognition theses. Or in Carter et al’s words: Bbecause the
existence of extended mental states—such as extended dispositional beliefs—is a claim
that is more counterintuitive and thereby less easy to argue for than the claim that there
are extended cognitive processes^ (Carter et al. 2014, p. 11). I am sympathetic to their
intuition but I am not sure whether this means that the cognitive bloat objection cannot
apply to extended or distributed cognitive processes. If one’s conditions for cognitive
extension or distribution are not sufficiently stringent, it may still result in a concep-
tualisation of processes that are extended or distributed too widely.
Nersessian’s account is elaborate, detailed, and insightful, but does not sufficiently
look at the conditions for cognitive distribution. Her notion of a cognitive partnership is
largely descriptive, not stipulative. So, on her view, it is difficult to determine when
something is part of a distributed cognitive system. I think both Giere and Nersessian’s
account can be enriched by incorporating elements from the multidimensional frame-
work presented below. In particular, to account for the diachronic aspects of distributed
cognitive systems. I will briefly come back to this point below in section BDiscussion^.
A second and perhaps less important shortcoming of both Giere and Nersessian’s
account is that they focus on representational artifacts (diagrams, models, and certain
instruments), in that way neglecting what I referred to as ecological artifacts. In order to
provide a more complete picture of the variety of situated cognitive systems in biology
labs (or any other laboratory or setting), we need to include ecological cognitive
artifacts in the analysis.
On the basis of Giere and Nersessian’s work, one may distinguish two approaches to
studying distributed cognitive systems in scientific laboratories. One can start by
identifying a large-scale system, such as the Indiana University Cyclotron Facility,
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and then try to identify all the relevant components and see how information trajecto-
ries are established and how all the components are integrated into larger distributed
systems. This may be called a top-down approach. Given that there are sometimes more
than a hundred researchers involved and numerous artifacts and instruments, the
information trajectories and the overall system are often so complicated that no single
ethnographer can observe such a system. So if one chooses a top-down approach, it is
only feasible when the system is sufficiently small to observe, which might in practice
be quite difficult. This is presumably why Giere, at least in some of his examples,
theorizes at a very general level of explanation without giving specific details of the
composition and integration of the large-scale systems he is theorizing about. By
contrast, one may also start at identifying small-scale systems, comprising of an
individual researcher and the artifact(s) he or she is interacting with. If that small-
scale system is part of a larger one, it may be possible to work your way up and include
more components in the analysis. This may be called a bottom-up approach. In the next
section, a bottom-up approach is developed and then applied to conceptualize how
researchers interact with their instruments and how they are, in some cases, integrated
into a larger distributed cognitive system.
4 Cognitive integration
4.1 Parity versus complementarity
In addition to Clark and Chalmers (1998) conditions of reliability, trust, accessibility,
and past endorsement, much extended mind theorizing has been motivated by the parity
principle:
BIf, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which,
were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of
the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the
cognitive process^ (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 8).
This principle invites us to see isomorphism between the inner (biological) and
the outer (artifactual) as a condition for cognitive extension. Some have argued
that there is no isomorphism between the inner and the outer: artifacts and other
resources have informational properties that are quite different from those of the
brain. Information stored in notebooks, for example, is not automatically
integrated with other information in the notebook and does not show the
primacy or recency effect. John Sutton (2010) therefore argues that it is much
better to think of the functions and properties of external resources as comple-
mentary to those of the brain (see also Menary 2007; Kiverstein and Farina 2011).
On such a view:
BContrary to any requirement of fine-grained similarity then, what the friends of
extended cognition actually expect, and study, are hybrid processes in which the
inner and the outer contributions are typically highly distinct in nature, yet deeply
integrated and complementary^ (Wilson and Clark 2009, p. 72).
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Cognitive integration of agent and resource is thus an important theme within a
complementarity view. This integration, I suggest, is a matter of degree and varies
along a number of dimensions.
4.2 A multidimensional approach
Building on Sutton (2006, 2010), Menary (2007, 2010), Wilson and Clark (2009), and
Sterelny (2010), (Heersmink 2014) develops a multidimensional framework to con-
ceptualize the interactions and degree of cognitive integration between agent and
artifact. 1 These dimensions provide a new perspective for thinking about when an
artifact or other external resource is part of an extended or distributed cognitive system:
Not in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but in terms of dimensions that are
matters of degree. This provides a more realistic view on such systems. Conceiving of
situated cognitive systems as either embedded/scaffolded or extended/distributed with a
clear boundary in between is not a realistic way to describe such systems, because some
may be more embedded or extended than others (Sutton et al. 2010).
The nature of their embeddedness or extendedness, I suggest, depends on the degree
of integration. So, rather than providing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
cognitive extension and distributed cognition, this framework provides a toolbox for
investigating the degree and nature of integration of agents and artifacts into Bnew
systemic wholes^ (Clark 2007). Situated systems that rank high on these dimensions
are deeply integrated and clear candidates for extended/distributed cognitive systems.
Whereas those that rank low on these dimensions are shallowly integrated and are clear
cases of embedded cognitive systems. In between there is a grey area in which it may
not always be clear whether a system is extended or merely embedded. Below I
concisely outline the eight dimensions, but for a more detailed description of each
dimension see (Heersmink 2014; for discussion see Clowes 2013).
4.2.1 Information flow
In situated cognitive systems, information flow between agent and artifact may be one-
way, two-way, or reciprocal. One-way information flow goes from artifact to agent.
Examples include using a map to navigate or a timetable to decide which train to take.
Two-way information flow goes from agent to artifact and then from artifact to agent.
Examples include writing an appointment in your diary and looking it up at some later
point or deliberately leaving a rented DVD on your desk so that you will bring it back.
Reciprocal information flow concern more complicated informational exchanges be-
tween agent and artifact. In such cases, the artifact is part of an ongoing cognitive task.
Examples include making a difficult calculation with pen and paper, reorganizing
Scrabble tiles, or writing an academic paper. These examples are often seen as the
paradigm cases of extended cognitive systems. In such cases, there is not one cycle of
1 See Duncan Pritchard (2010) for a related discussion in epistemology on the conditions of extended
knowledge. In future research it may be interesting to compare these conditions of extended knowledge with
my multidimensional framework.
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offloading and intake of information, but various incremental and interdependent cycles
of informational offloading and intake.
4.2.2 Accessibility
How accessible an artifact is, is important for the degree of integration (Clark and
Chalmers 1998). If the artifact is not reliable available when needed, it cannot be used
for performing some cognitive task. So the more reliable the artifact is accessible, the
easier it can be integrated into the cognitive system of its user. Mobile computing
devices, for example, are highly accessible and thus easily integrated, whereas library
books only when you go to the library. They are much less accessible and thus more
difficult to integrate into the task.
4.2.3 Durability
This dimension concerns how often we use an artifact. Following Wilson and Clark
(2009), a distinction can be made between one-offs, repeated, and permanent relation-
ships to external resources. A token shopping-list is typically a one-off, a token map is
often repeatedly used, and a token laptop computer is used many times over a long
period of time. Generally, the more often we use an artifact, the more we rely on it and
the deeper it is integrated into our cognitive system.
4.2.4 Trust
Trust is about our cognitive attitude towards the truth-value of information. Whether we
trust external information is important, because information we do not trust, we usually
do not use to help us perform our cognitive tasks. Trust can be implicit or explicit.
When we implicitly trust information, we have not consciously evaluated it, but assume
it is true. When we explicitly trust information, we have consciously evaluated it and
concluded it is true. For optimal cognitive performance, we implicitly trust information.
4.2.5 Procedural transparency
Procedural transparency concerns the effortlessness and lack of conscious attention
with which a cognitive artifact is used. The easier it is to use and interact with an
artifact, the more procedurally transparent it is. For instance, the first time I use a
computer, it is hard for me to use it smoothly, but when after a while my perceptual-
motor processes are proceduralized to such an extent that I do not consciously think
about how to interact with it.
4.2.6 Informational transparency
Informational transparency concerns the effortlessness with which an agent can inter-
pret and use information. The easier it is to interpret and understand external informa-
tion, the more transparent it is. Scientific equitations, for example, may be opaque for
novices but fully transparent for experts. The degree of informational transparency
usually depends on training and education.
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4.2.7 Individualization
Some cognitive artifacts are interchangeable whereas others are individualized
(Sterelny 2010). Those that are interchangeable include timetables, maps, clocks,
thermometers, and others. Those that are individualized include diaries, notebooks,
shopping-lists, and bookmarks of websites. Such artifacts are tailored for individual
cognitive goals, which typically increases the degree of integration between agent and
artifact.
4.2.8 Transformation
Interacting with cognitive artifacts transforms our onboard cognitive system. During
ontogeny, we internalize publically available representations like language and number
systems and learn to think in terms of those systems (Menary and Kirchhoff 2014). In
general, the longer we interact with cognitive artifacts, the more they transform our
cognitive system. Likewise, the informational properties of some cognitive artifacts are
static (e.g., textbooks), but others are dynamic and transform their properties over time
(e.g., computer simulations).
5 Conceptualizing cognitive integration: case studies
In this section, I apply these dimensions to conceptualize the interactions and degree of
integration between researchers and artifacts, demonstrating the usefulness of situated
cognition theory for the philosophy of scientific practice (see also Arnau et al. 2014). I
focus on four case studies: computer models (icons), pH-meters (indices), laboratory
notebooks (symbols), and organised work-environments (spatial ecological artifacts).
These artifacts have different informational properties and are chosen to examine
whether their specific informational properties are integrated into the cognitive systems
of theirs users to different degrees.
5.1 Representational artifacts
5.1.1 Computer models of protein folding
Biologists often use computer models to gain knowledge about some target system (see
e.g., Humphrey 2009; Winsberg 2010; Beisbart 2012). Here I take a closer look at
computer simulations of protein folding. After a protein is synthesized by a ribosome in
a cell, it starts as a long chain of amino acids referred to as its primary structure. This
primary structure first coils into a number of secondary structures such as alpha-helices
and beta-sheets, which in turn, fold into the eventual three-dimensional tertiary struc-
ture. A protein’s tertiary structure determines its function and is therefore important to
better understand. The problem molecular biologists face is how a long chain of amino
acids eventually results in the tertiary structure of the protein. This folding process is
quite complicated, not yet fully understood, and very difficult to study in vivo (i.e.,
within cells). For these and other reasons, molecular biologists use computer simula-
tions of the folding process.
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There are two main stages in the simulation process: building the simulation and
running it. In most cases, the amino acid sequence of a protein is known and used as
input for the simulation. Amino acids have certain properties that determine how they
will interact with other amino acids. The software program contains all the necessary
information to simulate the interactions between different amino acids such as infor-
mation about bonds, angles, torsion angles, and electrostatic interactions. When the
simulation has been successfully built, it is run and visualized on a computer screen.
The in vivo folding process takes milliseconds, but the simulation can be run as slow as
a researcher wants. Typically the simulation is slowed down a hundred to a thousand
times, in order to scrutinize each step in the folding process.
Simulations are clear cases of cognitive artifacts that complement the shortcomings
of our onboard cognitive capacities. Trying to mentally visualize a static three-
dimensional structure such as a protein is already quite difficult, if possible at all, but
trying to mentally visualize the folding of a protein over time, is for most people
impossible. During a simulation, the angle of the overall protein and speed of the
simulation can be altered, as to optimize perceptual access to salient properties of the
folding process. One can also zoom-in on a particular part of the protein. Thus, in terms
of information flow, a modeller first offloads information onto the computer system,
then the computer creates the simulation with which a modeller interacts in an ongoing
and iterative manner, thereby creating a reciprocal information flow structure.
Access to the simulation is reliable as it is run on computer systems that are typically
quite reliable. Further, because the simulation can be viewed from different angles,
slowed down or speeded up, and zoomed-in as to improve perceptual access to salient
parts of the folding process, it is fair to say that information access is highly reliable.
Because programming the simulation can take hours to days and analysing the simu-
lation usually takes many hours as well, the durability of the coupling is long.
Simulations are usually analysed a number of times, so a repeated but not permanent
relationship is established.
Trust in the correctness and truth-value of the simulation is generally high, but this
depends on the kind of simulation. The more that is known about a particular protein,
the more trust a modeller puts into its simulation. For example, when the tertiary
structure is known via crystallography but not its folding process, and when a simula-
tion results in a similar or identical tertiary structure, then there is little reason to distrust
the correctness of the simulation. But when simulating the folding of a protein whose
tertiary structure is unknown, then a modeller may be more cautious in accepting the
accuracy of the simulation. Note that accuracy here means degree of isomorphism
between the simulation and the actual folding process. Simulations may of course be
wrong in that the simulation is not isomorphic to the actual folding process. For
example, in some cases, the tertiary structure is known but not its folding process.
When a simulation results in a protein structure that is not similar to its known tertiary
structure, then modellers have good reasons to distrust the simulation. If a high degree
of trust is established, is it always after a modeller has consciously evaluated the
simulation, so trust in case of simulations always concerns explicit trust.
The degree of procedural transparency depends on the degree of understanding of
the software program, which may take some time and experience to develop. Using
simulation software requires knowledge about both molecular biology and computer
programming and the degree of transparency depends on this knowledge. For a novice,
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transparency is typically low, but for an experienced modeller it is high, with various
degrees of transparency in between. The informational transparency is most likely high,
as simulations of protein folding are highly isomorphic to the actual folding process.
Even for complete novices, the basics of a simulation are relatively easy to understand,
partly because simulations are approximations, simplifications, and idealisations of
their target systems, which makes them easier to understand and easier to study.
Whether simulations are individualized depends on the research goals of the mod-
eller. In some cases, simulations are performed by individual researchers working on
their specific projects, in which case the simulation is highly individualized. In other
cases, simulations are performed by a small team of researchers, in which case they are
less individualized. But either way, the outcomes of simulations are quite often
published and are thus aimed at a larger audience and are performed to contribute to
a better general understanding of molecular biology. In this sense, simulations are not
individualized, but part of a publically accessible body of knowledge.
Computer simulations of protein folding and protein structure have most likely
transformed the representational capacities of molecular biologists. Visualizing and
perceiving how an unobservable such as a protein behaves in vivo, has changed how
molecular biologists and others think about the structure of proteins. If a modeller
spends many hours analysing simulations of protein folding, then it is likely that the
modeller will have internalized at least some parts of the simulation, but it is difficult to
quantify how much computer simulations have transformed the representational capac-
ities of their users.
More generally, scientific models are representational systems that the brain is likely
to absorb relatively easily. Particularly models that are simplified and idealised are easy
to internalize. For example, textbook models of the solar system, the anatomy of the
human body, atomic structures, plate tectonics, and many other models have changed
the way we think about the physical world, not only for scientists but also for the general
public, as some of these models have found their way into popular culture. This is
because models make complicated processes or structures relatively easy to understand,
as their simplified and idealised isomorphic format is easy to interpret and internalize.
In sum, computer simulations of protein folding rank relatively high on most
dimensions. They rank medium on durability, but high on reliability and trust and after
some training they also rank high on procedural and informational transparency. They
may or may not be individualized, depending on each case, and it is difficult to quantify
how much they have transformed the representational capacities of their users, but it is
safe to say that there is some degree of transformation. But, most importantly, there is a
reciprocal information flow which means there is a significant degree of integration
between agent and simulation. Thus, given how computer simulations of protein
folding rank on the dimensions, it populates a higher region in the multidimensional
space and so integration between researcher and simulation is quite dense.
5.1.2 pH-meters
A common procedure in biology is to measure the acidity or alkalinity of a liquid, i.e.,
its pH. In order to obtain the pH value, a series of nested actions needs to be performed:
activating the device, dipping the measuring probe in the liquid, and interpreting its
reading. All this is typically done in a few seconds, resulting in a pH value that is
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measured to two decimals. When measuring pH, information flow is one-way, i.e.,
from artifact to researcher. Access to pH-meters is highly reliable, as there are usually a
number of pH-meters available in any biology lab. Moreover, pH-meters are regularly
calibrated to ensure accurate readings, which increases the reliability of the information.
Measuring pH is such a common procedure that the relation to pH-meters is often
repeated and thus a long-term, permanent relationship is established. Trust in the
accuracy of the reading is high, since pH-meters are regularly calibrated. Although
there may be cases when the reading is unusual which may prompt suspicion or
distrust, typically a researcher implicitly trusts the information it provides, i.e., s/he
does not consciously evaluate it. For experienced researchers, the procedural and
informational transparency are high, because they are trained in using pH-meters and
have used them countless of times. The process is proceduralized and they do not have
to consciously think about how to interact with the device or how to interpret its
reading. pH-meters are not individualized, but are interchangeable and used by all
members of the laboratory.
Finally, pH-meters may not have transformed the representational capacities of the
researchers’ brains in the same way as scientific models have, but they have trans-
formed how we think about acidity and alkalinity. They have also transformed many
cognitive practices in biology labs, because being able to accurately measure pH is
important for many experimental procedures. The representational state of the device is
dynamic and will change when the target system changes. However, in terms of
Nersessian’s notion of cognitive partnership, which is characterized by an evolving
and dynamic relation between agent and artifact, pH-meters do not qualify as artifacts
with which a cognitive partnership is established, because their functional properties do
not change over time.
In sum, pH-meters rank high on most dimensions. They rank high on all dimensions
except on individualization and transformation on which they rank low, and, impor-
tantly, the information flow is one-way. Given how it ranks on the above dimensions,
this situated cognitive system populates a region somewhere in the lower middle
regions of the multidimensional space. Indices do not afford two-way or reciprocal
information flow, because they have a direct causal connection to their target systems.
One can change their informational content only by altering the target system. So one
can reason about the information an index provides and one may use that information
to guide further action, but one cannot reason with indices in the same way as one can
with icons and symbols. This is so because they lack representational malleability, i.e.,
the capacity to change their content in an ongoing cognitive task. It is therefore difficult
for an index and its user to be deeply integrated into a larger system. Recall that one of
the reasons for taxonomizing cognitive artifacts was to examine whether artifacts in
different categories, i.e., with different informational properties, have different effects
on cognition and are integrated into the user’s cognitive system to different degrees.
Because indices lack the capacity for two-way or reciprocal information flow, they also
lack the capacity for deep integration.
5.1.3 Laboratory notebooks
pH-meters have only one cognitive function (to measure pH) and exhibit only one type
of information (a numerical value of pH). Laboratory notebooks, by contrast, are much
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more complicated as they serve a number of cognitive functions (mainly related to
memory and reasoning) and exhibit various types of information (language, equations,
tables, numbers, etc.). Lab notebooks are used for various cognitive tasks and serve a
number of cognitive functions:
– When performing an experiment, it is very hard to remember all the steps as most
experiments are rather complex and involve countless incremental steps. There-
fore, lab notebooks always contain a section on methodology, which is typically
written by the researcher, describing all the steps that need to be done in order to
perform the experiment. In this role, the notebook functions as a to-do list, so that
the researcher knows what to do and what has been done at any point in the
experiment.
– Observations made during the experiment are written in the notebook. In this role,
the notebook functions as a long-term external information-storage system, thereby
complementing the shortcomings of internal storage systems.
– Experimental outcomes are written in the notebook, sometimes as linguistic
descriptions but more often as tables, graphs, or other diagrams. In this way,
researchers later know what they have done during an experiment and what the
outcome of the experiment was. These experimental outcomes are often
discussed during lab meetings where notebooks plays a crucial role as memory
aids.
– In addition to these predominantly memory aiding functions, notebooks are also
used to solves equations, perform calculations, or draw graphs, tables, or other
diagrams. In these roles, the notebook serves more as a facilitator of ongoing
reasoning processes.
Depending on the task for which it is used, information flow between notebook and
user is two-way or reciprocal. When an experimental procedure is first written in the
notebook and then later used to help organise the experiment, information flow is two-
way because there are two steps involved: offloading and intake. But when it is used to
perform calculations, solve chemical equations, or draw graphs or tables, then a
reciprocal system is established. This is so because performing these tasks typically
involves many cycles of offloading and intake and each cycle depends on the outcome
of the previous one. Each step in the overall cognitive task thus builds and depends on
and the previous step and are therefore interdependent.
Access to the notebook is highly reliable, as it is standard procedure to always have
it around when performing experiments. Some researchers make photocopies of their
lab notebooks so that they have a backup of it, which increases reliability. The
information itself is, in most cases, also highly reliable. But there may, of course, be
cases in which mistakes are made when performing calculations, solve equations, and
so on, in which case the information is less reliable or unreliable. Given that the
notebook is used many times throughout the day, a repeated relationship is established.
Most of the information in the notebook is implicitly trusted, i.e., not consciously
evaluated, because it is written by the researcher, but also because some of the
information is standardized. Most experimental procedures, for example, are standard-
ized so that they need little evaluation when used to guide the experiment. But when
interpreting experimental outcomes, more evaluation is needed and the data may not be
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trusted by default. After conscious evaluation, a researcher may either explicitly trust
the data or distrust it.
Interacting with notebooks is rather straightforward, so the procedural transparency
is high. The information in it (e.g., sentences, calculations, equations) is written by the
researcher, so it is easy to interpret and process. Although there may be cases in which a
researcher has quickly written some observations in the notebook that are hard to
interpret or understand at some later point, generally the informational transparency is
high. The notebook is highly individualized and is deeply engrained in many of the
cognitive practices of the individual user. The information in the notebook is meant to
perform his/her specific experiments and the observations s/he writes in it result from
her experiments. So it is as individualized as a cognitive artifact can be. Researchers
also deeply depend on it. If the notebook got lost, a researcher would have trouble
performing experiments and the experimental data would be lost.
Finally, the notebook most likely does not transform the representational capacities
of their users. Only interacting with representational systems such as language, math-
ematics, and perhaps some notational systems in science like chemical equations or
models will significantly transform the representational capacities of embodied brains.
Single artifacts most likely do not transform the brain in the same way representational
systems do. However, artifacts do (sometimes quite dramatically) transform our cog-
nitive practices. Lab notebooks, for example, have significantly transformed many of
the cognitive practices in laboratories (see, e.g., Tweney and Ayala 2015; Holmes et al.
2003). In sum, lab notebooks rank high on all dimensions, except transformation. They
furthermore exhibit two-way and reciprocal information flow. Given this score, note-
books populate a higher region in the multidimensional space and, therefore, notebooks
and their users are deeply integrated into a distributed cognitive system.
5.2 Ecological artifacts
Biologists working in laboratories organise their work-environment such that the
location of the artifacts used in performing their experiments facilitates the cognitive
tasks they are performing. This intelligent use of space reduces the cognitive load in
perceptual and memory tasks, in that way complementing their cognitive processes.
When preparing the experiment by intentionally putting artifacts in particular locations
on one’s workbench, task-relevant information is encoded into the artifacts and their
locations. So information is first offloaded onto the environment by intentionally
putting artifacts at certain locations and then taken onboard at some later point. A
two-way information flow system is thus established. Kirsh (1995) makes a tripartite
distinction between spatial arrangements that simplify choice, perception, or internal
computation. Organised workplaces in laboratories seem to mainly simplify choice and
perception. When scientific instruments are placed such that they facilitate the steps in
performing an experiment, a researcher does not have to choose which steps to perform
as these are embedded in the environment. Likewise, a researcher does not have to scan
the work-environment to look for the relevant instrument, but knows they are all within
reach. Decision-making and perception are thus made easier by structuring the
environment.
Access to the information is highly reliable, as the information is always there when
it is needed, i.e., when performing the experiment one is sitting at one’s organised
The cognitive integration of scientific instruments 533
workplace which is central in one’s visual field. Performing an experiment can take
thirty minutes or several days. So depending on each experiment, the duration of the
coupling is medium to very long. Organised workplaces are repeatedly created and in
that sense a permanent relationship is established with such ecological artifacts.
However, given that each experiment may require different instruments, set-ups, and
procedures - the ecological artifacts that are created for each experiment will have
different structures and will have different informational properties. So there is no
permanent relation established to specific ecological artifacts, unless an experiment is
performed many times, but typically new ecological artifacts are created for each
experiment.
The amount of trust in the correctness of the information is generally high, as the
researcher herself has placed the artifacts in their correct location. When performing the
experiment, a researcher most likely will not consciously evaluate whether the location
of artifacts indicates the correct order of steps in the experiment, but will implicitly trust
it is correct. The procedural transparency is high, as the researcher herself has put the
artifacts at certain locations and s/he knows how to extract the task-relevant informa-
tion. Similarly, the informational transparency is high, too, because the user has created
the ecological artifacts herself. Organized workplaces are highly individualized, as it
concerns the specific experiments of individual researchers. In some cases, however,
experiments may be performed by two or more researchers, in which case they share an
organised workspace. Finally, organised workplaces most likely do not transform the
representational capacities of their creators, because they do no concern external
representations.
In sum, organized workspaces rank low on transformation, the durability depends on
the kind and complexity of the experiment, and they rank high on reliability, trust,
procedural and informational transparency, and individualization. Given how organised
workspaces rank on the dimensions, they populate an upper middle region of the
multidimensional space and are thus not deeply integrated. They are therefore candi-
dates for embedded cognitive systems.
5.3 Discussion
How does the proposed multidimensional framework relate to Giere and Nersessian’s
approaches? I criticized Giere for having a too liberal criterion for cognitive distribution
and Nersessian for a lack of such a criterion. On my view, the degree of integration is a
criterion for being part of a distributed cognitive system. The higher a situated cognitive
system ranks on these dimensions, the denser the integration between agent and artifact,
and the more likely it is that the artifact is part of a distributed cognitive system. The
view I propose here is thus not one in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but
one that puts membership of a distributed cognitive system on a spectrum.
The case studies demonstrate that the degree of cognitive integration between agent
and artifact in biological practice can vary substantially such that different situated
cognitive systems populate different regions in the multidimensional space (see
Table 1). When an artifact is used for a longer period of time and the relationship to
it becomes gradually more durable, individualized, transparent, and trustworthy, the
overall system becomes increasingly more integrated. Generally, there is a tendency for
situated systems to become integrated more deeply over time. However, most situated
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cognitive systems are dynamic and can shift from one region of this multidimensional
space to another. For example, when it turns out the pH of a liquid is 9.5, when one
knows it is acidic and should thus be below 7, a researcher knows there is something
wrong with the pH-meter. This will reduce the amount of trust in the reading of the
meter and so it will rank lower on the dimension of trust, which will also reduce the
amount of integration between agent and artifact. So, the degree and nature of integra-
tion may change over time, because there will always be (small) changes in one of the
dimensions.
The framework presented above is thus able to deal with these diachronic aspects of
situated cognitive systems and can contribute to a better understanding of what
Nersessian has called a Bcognitive partnership^ between researcher and artifact. More
concretely, the diachronic aspect of distributed cognitive systems can be further
conceptualized by the dimensions of trust, procedural transparency, informational
transparency, individualization, and transformation. These dimensions are meant to
capture the diachronic nature of situated cognitive systems. Over time, researchers learn
to trust the informational properties of the artifact. When they get more skilful in using
and manipulating the artifact, the procedural transparency increases and they find it
easier to interpret the information of the artifact and so the informational transparency
increases as well. During an experiment, the artifact is individualized in terms of the
epistemic goals of the experiment. The informational properties of the artifact are
transformed and, depending on the amount of use, the artifact may also have trans-
formed the onboard cognitive system of its user, i.e., the researcher learns to think in
terms of the informational properties of the artifact.
6 Concluding summary
This paper first developed a classification system for cognitive artifacts used in
biological practice. In doing so, I focussed on the informational properties of artifacts,
because the way artifacts are used depends on the information they contain. Classifying
artifacts in this way is more conducive to an analysis of the cognitive interactions
Table 1 Overview of the case studies in terms of each dimension
Dimension Iconic computer
models
Indexical
pH-meters
Symbolic lab
notebooks
Ecological organised
workplaces
Information flow Reciprocal One-way Reciprocal Two-way
Accessibility High High High High
Durability Medium High High Medium
Trust Medium-High High High High
P-transparency High High High High
I-transparency High High High High
Individualization High Low High High
Transformation Low Low Low Low
Integration Dense Shallow Dense Medium
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between researchers and artifacts as compared to other classifications. Having this
classification system in place, I then used a multidimensional framework to conceptu-
alize the degree of integration between researcher and various artifacts. I focussed on
four case studies: computer models of protein folding, pH-meters, laboratory note-
books, and organised work-environments. Computer models and notebooks are deeply
integrated because they have a high informational malleability and reciprocal informa-
tion flow, whereas pH meters and all other indices lack this malleability and reciprocity.
One important property of models (icons), notebooks (symbols) and also organised
workspaces (spatial ecological artifacts) is that the users have intentional agency over
the informational content of the artifact, which significantly increases the degree of
integration. Other important factors include the trustworthiness of the information, the
procedural and informational transparency, and the degree of individualisation.
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